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Abstract 
In this paper, I shall argue that the evidence supports, at the 
very best for the anti-gun side, agnosticism about the negative 
criminogenic effects of gun ownership. Given the plausible 
proposition that there is at least a prima facie moral right (a 
right that can be outweighed given sufficiently weighty 
considerations) to keep and bear arms, I argue that 
agnosticism supports the proposition that there ought to be a 
legal right to keep and bear arms. 
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eliefs about guns are almost invariably formed in 
response to highly publicised mass shootings and 
stories about violent gun crimes, and not on the basis of an 
impartial examination of the relevant criminological 
evidence. The emotional responses of people to these kinds 
of events have a significant impact on public policy, 
usually in the direction of gun control and outright gun 
bans. Outright bans and strict controls immediately 
followed the Dunblane and Port Arthur massacres in the 
United Kingdom and Australia, respectively. The situation 
in the United States is much more complex (because gun 
ownership rights are constitutionally protected), but calls 
for strict gun controls by high-level politicians (which were 
ultimately unsuccessful) immediately followed the 
infamous Aurora and Newtown massacres. In this paper, I 
shall argue that these kinds of immediate (largely 
emotional) responses are irrational in the light of the 
evidence. The evidence that the prevalence of gun 
ownership significantly increases violent crime is very 
weak. Indeed, the best evidence suggests either that there is 
a negative effect on crime or no discernible effect 
whatever. I shall argue that the evidence supports, at the 
very best for the anti-gun side, agnosticism about the 
negative criminogenic effects of gun ownership. Given the 
plausible proposition that there is at least a prima facie 
moral right (a right that can be outweighed given 
sufficiently weighty considerations) to keep and bear arms, 
I argue that agnosticism supports the proposition that there 
ought to be a legal right to keep and bear arms.  
 
The central thesis of this paper is as follows:  
 
(GVA) Nobody who has impartially examined the 
extant criminological evidence knows that the 
B 
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criminogenic harms of gun ownership and carrying 
outweigh the benefits. 
 
The philosophical significance of GVA will become clearer 
later in this paper, but I shall briefly state why it is 
significant, if true. If there is a prima facie right to own a 
gun, then a gun ban would be just (in the fact-relative 
sense) only if the harms of common gun ownership 
significantly outweigh the benefits (to a degree sufficient to 
override the right). Insofar as gun bans ought to be 
implemented by politicians only after they know that this 
consequentialist calculation is true on the basis of an 
impartial examination of the extant evidence, GVA implies 
that a gun ban in the US that is based on the proposition 
that the criminogenic harms of gun ownership and carrying 
outweigh the benefits would be unjust (at least in the 
evidence-relative sense).i 
 
Let us now consider whether GVA is true. The truth of 
GVA depends importantly on whether the extant 
criminological evidence significantly supports the 
following three hypotheses:  
 
Crime-increasing hypothesis (CIH): Gun ownership 
causes significant increases in rates of violent crime.  
 
Homicide-increasing hypothesis (HIH): Gun 
ownership causes significant increases in rates of 
homicide.  
 
Anti-Carrying hypothesis (ACH): Laws that allow 
civilians to carry firearms concealed in public 
significantly increase violent crime rates.  
 
After an impartial examination of the relevant evidence, 
someone knows that the criminogenic harms of gun 
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ownership and carrying outweigh the benefits only if she 
knows that CIH, HIH, and ACH are true, and she knows 
that they are true only if the evidence supports these 
hypotheses. Moreover, the evidence supports them in the 
relevant sense only if they are more probable than not given 
that evidence. In what follows, I shall argue that the extant 
criminological evidence very probably does not support 
CIH, HIH, or ACH in this way.  
 
What, then, does the evidence say? It will be helpful to 
begin with a very recent methodological survey of the 
relevant evidence. Kleck (2015) reviewed 41 studies that 
tested CIH and HIH. He identified methodologically 
superior studies on the basis of the following criteria:    
 
1. A valid measure of gun levels was used.  
2. The authors made an attempt to control for more than a 
handful of possible confounding variables.  
3. The authors ‘used suitable causal order procedures to 
deal with the possibility of crime rates affecting gun 
rates, instead of the reverse.’ 
 
It is very clear that the evidence does not support CIH. Of 
the 90 findings generated by the 41 studies reviewed, only 
26 (~29%) support CIH, whereas 64 (~71%) found against 
CIH. None of the findings of studies for which more than 
one of (1) – (3) are true supported CIH. The same trend 
holds with respect to HIH. Only 36% of studies for which 
(1) is true support HIH compared to 62% of studies for 
which (1) is false. Of the studies for which (3) is false, 57% 
support HIH; no studies for which (3) is true found in 
favour of HIH. Of the studies for which (2) is false, that is, 
of the studies that controlled for fewer than five significant 
control variables, 59% found in favour of HIH. This drops 
to just 17% for studies that controlled for more than five 
significant control variables. Remarkably, 14 of the 41 
Gun Violence Agnosticism | Bernstein 
 
236 
 
studies reviewed by Kleck did not control for a single 
confounder and these were the studies that were most likely 
to find in favour of CIH and HIH. Importantly, only six 
studies controlled for more than five statistically significant 
control variables and all of them failed to support CIH and 
83% found against HIH (they found either that there is no 
discernible effect or a slight crime-decreasing effect). 
Finally, there were only three studies for which all of (1) – 
(3) are true and none of them supported CIH or HIH. On 
the contrary, Kovandzic et al. (2013), who controlled for 
ten confounding variables, found that increases in 
noncriminal gun prevalence would moderately decrease 
both gun and total homicide rates. Of the studies for which 
all of (1) – (3) are false (23 of the 41 reviewed), 65% found 
in favour of HIH.ii Kleck concludes: ‘The overall pattern is 
very clear—the more methodologically adequate research 
is, the less likely it is to support the more guns-more crime 
hypothesis.’ Kleck’s conclusion, if correct, strongly 
supports GVA.   
 
One implication of the above is that many of the arguments 
endorsed by anti-gun philosophers fail. Dixon (2011), for 
example, appeals to Killias (1993), Hemenway and Miller 
(2000), and Killias et al. (2001) in support of CIH and HIH. 
But, according to Kleck (2015), these were among the 
studies that controlled for no significant control variables 
and did not take into account the causal order problem. In 
other words, the studies to which Dixon appealed in 
support of his argument from net harms are among the 
methodologically worst studies available. The best studies 
cannot be used to support CIH or HIH in an argument for 
gun bans.  
 
The general conclusion to GVA and against CIH or HIH 
is supported by two meta-analyses published by the U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and the Centers for 
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Disease Control (CDC). Wellford et al. (2004), on behalf 
of the NAS, reviewed 253 articles, 99 books, and 43 
government publications and ‘failed to identify any gun 
control that had reduced violent crime, suicide, or gun 
accidents.’iii Specifically, they could not determine 
whether associations between gun ownership and 
homicide demonstrate a causal relationship. Indeed, they 
concluded that ‘existing research studies and data include 
a wealth of descriptive information...but...do not credibly 
demonstrate a causal relationship between the ownership 
of firearms and the causes or prevention of criminal 
violence or suicide.’iv Hahn et al. (2003: 18), on behalf of 
the CDC, also reviewed the then-extant literature and 
concluded that there was ‘insufficient evidence to 
determine the effectiveness of any of the firearms laws 
reviewed for preventing violence.’ Kleck’s (2015) recent 
review of the literature is an important update and coheres 
well with these earlier results. Once again, given these 
findings, GVA is very plausible.  
 
What does the evidence say about ACH? So-called ‘shall-
issue laws’ allow apparently law-abiding civilians to carry 
guns concealed in public. One might object by arguing that 
allowing people to carry firearms significantly harms 
society, perhaps by increasing violent crime. Presumably 
the idea is that permit holders are prone to commit violent 
crimes, particularly with their guns. This is far from 
obvious. The state with the greatest number of permit 
holders is Florida (1.2 million, or about 8.2% of the state’s 
population). From 1987 to 2014, Florida issued permits to 
more than 2.6 million people, but only ‘168 (about 
0.006%)…have had their permits revoked for any type of 
firearms related violation, the most common being 
accidentally carrying a concealed handgun into a gun-free 
zone such as a school or an airport, not threats or acts of 
violence...For all revocations, the annual rate…is 0.012%.’v 
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By comparison, the annual rate of firearms violations by 
police (from 1 Jan 2005 to 31 Dec 2007) in Florida was 
0.007%, higher than the rate for permit holders.vi 
Moreover, far from supporting ACH, the evidence seems to 
support the hypothesis that these laws reduce violent crime. 
Of the peer-reviewed studies, 20 found in favour of the 
crime-reduction hypothesisvii and 11 found no discernible 
effect. No peer-reviewed study published in an academic 
journal has hitherto supported ACH.viii  
 
Interestingly, the number of people with concealed 
handgun permits has increased significantly in the last few 
years. In 2011, at least 8 million people had permits, an 
increase from 4.6 million in 2007. This increased to well 
over 11 million people as of June 2014 (this is just over 
4.5% of the total population).ix If it were true that shall-
issue laws contributed significantly to violent crime, we 
would expect significant increases in violent crime to 
follow significant increases in the number of permit holders 
and gun carriers. In fact, the opposite is the case:  
 
Between 2007 and the preliminary estimates for 
2013, murder rates have fallen from 5.6 to 4.4 per 
100,000—a 22 percent drop in the murder rate at 
the same time that the percentage of the adult 
population with permits soared by 130 percent. 
Overall violent crime also fell by the same 
percentage, 22 percent, over that period of time. 
Using this new state level permit data from 2007 on, 
our analysis suggests that each one percentage point 
increase in the percent of the adult population 
holding permits is roughly associated with a 1.4 
percent drop in the murder rate.x 
 
At the very best for the anti-gun side, the evidence supports 
the middle ground on which these laws do not contribute 
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significantly to rates of violent crime one way or the other. 
At worst, the evidence supports the hypothesis that these 
laws reduce violent crime. There is no evidence from the 
academic, peer-reviewed literature to suppose that ACH is 
the case.  If the crime-reduction hypothesis is correct, the 
best explanation is that criminals are deterred from 
committing crimes in areas where there is a reasonable 
chance that potential victims will be armed. Because these 
handguns are carried concealed, criminals are not able to 
know in advance which of their victims will be unarmed. 
The risk to criminals in these areas is, therefore, far greater 
than in areas where gun carrying by civilians is prohibited.  
 
Here is where we stand so far. The qualitatively best 
studies support neither CIH nor HIH. Studies that support 
either of these two hypotheses suffer from significant 
methodological flaws. If this is right, the conclusion we 
ought to draw is that the extant scholarly criminological 
research does not make CIH and HIH more probable than 
not, and because this is a requirement of knowing whether 
CIH and HIH are true (after an impartial examination of the 
evidence), it follows that anybody who is aware of these 
facts does not know that CIH and HIH are true. We saw, 
furthermore, that not a single published peer-reviewed 
article supports ACH and most support the hypothesis that 
carry laws decrease violent crime. Given the extant 
evidence on this question, we are at best warranted in 
believing that these laws do not contribute significantly to 
violent crime one way or the other. If all of the above is 
correct, then GVA is true. Knowledge that gun ownership 
and carrying causes more harm from crime than good 
requires knowledge that CIH, HIH, and ACH are true, 
which in turn requires sufficient evidence. As we have 
seen, we lack sufficient evidence to know that these 
hypotheses are correct. I conclude that GVA is true.  
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What is the significance of GVA’s being true? I claim that 
GVA, in conjunction with the proposition that we have a 
prima facie right to keep and bear arms, implies that there 
ought to be a legal right to keep and bear arms and that, 
therefore, a gun ban would be unjust. Before we see why, let 
us first examine the reasons we have to suppose that such a 
right exists. Most philosophers argue for the right to keep 
and bear arms from the right of self-defence.xi Elsewhere, I, 
with colleagues, have argued as follows: If x (where x is an 
artifact or tool) is a reasonable means of individual self-
defence, then people have a prima facie right to be allowed 
to own x. Firearms are a reasonable means of individual self-
defence. Hence, people have a prima facie right to be 
allowed to own firearms.xii By a ‘reasonable means of 
individual self-defense,’ I mean a means of self-defense that 
is able to effectively and reliably deliver a proportionate 
amount of force and is able to discriminate between an 
aggressor and innocent bystander (unlike, say, nuclear 
weapons).xiii There is a good amount of empirical evidence 
that guns qualify as reasonable in this sense. Using data from 
the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Crime 
Victimization Survey, Kleck (2001: 289) found that using a 
gun defensively is very effective at reducing a victim’s risk 
of injury in assaults. After assault victims took self-
protection action with a gun, only 3.6 per cent were injured, 
compared to 12.6 per cent of victims who screamed, 15.2 per 
cent of victims who tried to reason with the offender, 8.6 per 
cent of victims who attacked the offender without a weapon, 
5.4 per cent of victims who attempted to flee, and 55.2 per 
cent of victims who took no self-protection actions 
whatever. In the vast majority of these cases, victims did not 
actually fire the gun; they merely had to brandish the 
weapon in order to break off an attack.xiv  
 
But we do not need to argue from self-defence to get to this 
conclusion. Liberty considerations will get us to it, for we 
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may argue as follows. People have a right to be allowed to 
own x if owning x is not intrinsically immoral and there are 
no overriding contingent reasons for prohibiting the owning 
of x. That is, there is a defeasible presumption in favour of 
liberty. But ownership of guns is not intrinsically immoral. 
There are clearly situations in which gun ownership is not 
wrong. Consider cases in which one’s government is 
extremely repressive or in which one’s country is occupied 
by a foreign and brutal invader. It is very implausible to 
suppose that armed resistance of this kind of oppression is 
wrong (think about resistance fighters during the Second 
World War). Or consider cases in which one’s government 
has completely failed to fight violent crime such that there 
is a significant probability that one’s life will be threatened. 
Defence of the citizenry falls under the police powers of the 
state. It is plausible to suppose that when the state is unable 
to fulfill its obligations the power falls back into the hands 
of the citizenry. Would we say of someone who has 
decided to obtain a gun in order to protect his family when 
his government has failed to do so that he has acted 
wrongly? Surely not. If this is right, then ownership of 
firearms is not intrinsically immoral. Consequently, people 
have a right to be allowed to own a gun if there are not 
overriding contingent reasons for prohibition. This just is a 
prima face right to be allowed to own a gun.xv  
 
So far we have the conclusion: given that there are no 
overriding contingent reasons for prohibition, people have a 
right to own a gun. In this paper, I have questioned whether 
one reason to suppose that there are overriding contingent 
reasons for prohibition succeeds, namely, that the 
criminogenic harms outweigh the benefits. But one can still 
question whether guns ought to be allowed given the 
obvious truth that some people are harmed as a result of 
their being permitted. In response, why should this fact be 
seen as an overriding consideration? Rights are supposed to 
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hold in the face of negative consequences; so merely 
pointing out that people sometimes use guns to wrongly 
harm other people is not sufficient to establish the 
conclusion that there is an overriding reason to ban guns. 
The proponent of this line would have to say that the harm 
caused by private gun ownership is so great that the prima 
facie right is overridden, but she cannot say that if there are 
no significant effects one way or the other. If what I have 
argued above is close to being accurate, it is unlikely, given 
the evidence, that this is the case. It is hard to see why guns 
should be banned because the harm they cause is so great if 
the same harm would obtain in the absence of guns. 
Moreover, for all the objector knows, more people would 
be harmed following a gun ban as a result of their not 
having a very effective self-defense tool, and these 
considerations seem to be at least on a par.  
 
We now have the truth of GVA and the proposition that 
people have a prima facie right to own a gun. How do these 
two propositions imply that there ought to be a legal right 
to keep and bear arms and that a gun ban would be unjust? 
As previously mentioned, a prima facie right is a right that 
can be outweighed or overruled by sufficiently weighty 
considerations. The government ought to infringe on these 
rights only if (a) the reason for doing so is sufficiently 
weighty (i.e. is such that if it were true, it would justify 
infringement), (b) it knows that this reason is true (or at 
least that it is likely to be true, given the evidence), and (c) 
is based on an impartial examination and correct 
assessment of the extant evidence. Otherwise, the 
infringement will be unjust. Laws that will infringe on the 
rights of people on the basis of empirical considerations 
ought not be based on ideology, feelings, emotions, 
prejudices, etc. They ought to be based on a fair 
examination of the evidence. We would be entitled to 
criticize the government for basing a policy that infringes 
Essays in Philosophy 16(2) 
 
243 
 
on our rights on the basis of, say, one study that is 
inconsistent with the findings of all other studies on the 
relevant question. Given GVA, (b) and (c) are false, which 
implies that the consequent of the conditional claim is false. 
As we have seen, the extant evidence does not make it 
probable that any of the anti-gun hypotheses we have 
considered are true. If I am right about the evidence, then 
politicians who correctly impartially examine the evidence 
cannot justify their support for gun bans on the basis of that 
evidence. It follows that governments ought not infringe on 
the right of people to own guns. Gun bans are unjust in the 
light of these considerations.xvi  
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NOTES 
 
i In this paper, I deal only with crime as a potential reason for gun bans, 
but it is also possible to construct an argument from gun suicides for 
gun bans. For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume that all such 
arguments fail.  
Gun Violence Agnosticism | Bernstein 
 
246 
 
 
ii There were 15 studies for which only one of (1) – (3) are true; seven 
supported CIH and eight failed to support CIH. There were no studies 
for which only two of (1) – (3) were true. 
iii Kates and Mauser (2007: 654) 
iv Wellford et al. (2004: 6). 
v Lott (2014b: 7). 
vi Ibid. 
vii For example, Lott and Mustard (1997), Plassman and Whitley 
(2003), and Gius (2014) all found in favour of the crime reduction 
hypothesis. 
viii See Lott (2014a).  
ix Lott (2014b: 8-9).  
x Ibid. 
xi See, for example, Huemer (2003).  
xii Bernstein et al. (2015a; forthcoming).   
xiii Most other tools require the victim to physically engage her attacker, 
which is problematic for victims who tend to be physically weaker than 
their attackers (e.g. women, the elderly, the disabled, etc.).  
xiv See Lott (2010: 3).  
xv See Bernstein (2015b).  
xvi Thanks to Tim Hsiao and an anonymous referee for helpful 
comments and suggestions.  
